8. Vienna Seminar of Nobel Laureates

Economics

The eighth Vienna Seminar of Nobel Laureates, focusing on the theme of “Economics”, took place from October 14 to 16, 2013, in collaboration with the University of Vienna, the Vienna University of Economics and Business, and the City of Vienna / Wiener Vorlesungen. Nobel laureates James Heckman, Finn Kydland, and Roger Myerson were invited.

On October 15, the seminar commenced with a discussion round at the University of Vienna, involving Nobel laureates, junior researchers, and faculty members. The day concluded with a ceremony event / Vienna Lecture and a panel discussion at Vienna City Hall.

The following day featured specialized lectures and a faculty session at the Vienna University of Economics and Business. The seminar continued with “Meet the Laureates - Innovation for Industry” at the Sky Lounge of the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber and concluded with a panel discussion on “Strengthening Europe: Education, Innovation, Entrepreneurship” at the House of Industry.

The members of the 2013 Scientific Advisory Board were Alexander von Gabain, Gerhard Sorger and Barbara Sporn.

Nobel Laureates 2013

James J. Heckman

James J. Heckman was born in Chicago, Illinois, in 1944. Together with Daniel McFadden he received the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 2000 for having developed theories and methods for analyzing selective samples.

He studied at Princeton University and has been teaching at the University of Chicago since 1973. He directs the Center for Social Program Evaluation at the Harris School for Public Policy, teaches at the University College Dublin, and is Senior Research Fellow at the American Bar Foundation.

James Heckman uses micro-econometric methods for problems where the available data do not correctly represent the population. Such a selection bias may arise from data ascertainment or from the economic incentives to which the analyzed economic units are exposed. The methods developed by James Heckman enable the identification and elimination of errors and misinterpretations that can be ascribed to selection biases.

Finn E. Kydland

Finn E. Kydland was born in Gjesdal, Norway in 1943 and received together with Edward Prescott the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 2004 for his contributions to dynamic macroeconomics.

Finn Kydland studied at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration and at Carnegie Mellon University where earned his PhD and taught from 1977to 2004. Currently he is Henley Professor of Economics at the University of California in Santa Barbara.

In his research Finn Kydland focuses on the Real Business Cycle Theory (RBC) that sees business cycle fluctuations as a result of real shocks to the economy. Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott analyzed the effects of technological shocks in the production, i.e. innovations, environmental and safety regulations on economic growth and the business cycle. In their work they found out that changes in technology affect both output and employment and that this will lead to business cycle fluctuations.

Roger B. Myerson

Roger B. Myerson was born in Boston, Massachusetts, in 1951 and was awarded the Nobel Prize for Economic Sciences together with Leonid Hurwicz and Eric Maskin in 2007 for his work on the economic mechanism design theory.

He studied Mathematics at Harvard University and taught at Northwestern University. At the same time he has been visiting professor at the Center for Interdisciplinary Research in Bielefeld. Today he is Glen A. Lloyd Distinguished Service Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago.

Mechanism design theory was developed by Leonid Hurwicz and has been extended significantly by Eric Maskin and Roger Myerson. Roger Myerson has proven the Revelation Principle in a very general framework and applied it to various economic situations, e.g. auctions or market regulation. When designing optimal mechanisms in situations with incomplete information (e.g. contracts, institutions) it is possible to restrict oneself, based on the Revelation Principle, on those mechanisms where the contracting parties truly reveal their type.